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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 3.1 million
asylum seekers among 25.4 million international refugees.1 Flouting the “principles and
practices” of historic immigration law, the United States responded to this crisis with increased
restrictions, including curbing asylum requests, setting stricter criteria for immigrants, increasing
border security, and reducing resettlement quotas.2 Refugees currently face threats including a
growing sex trafficking industry and increasing violence against women in refugee camps. 3
Meanwhile, U.S. political leaders continue to villainize migrants generally, 4 and U.S. asylum
policy has shifted from a focus on the rights and safety of asylees to a focus on exclusion in the
name of national security.5 Under the Administration of President Donald Trump, a string of
asylum decisions have applied this new exclusion focus by imposing an unnecessarily strict
standard for a successful asylum claim. 6 This standard is neither humane nor in line with the
purpose and intent of United States asylum processes.
Title VIII of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which defines the scope of review
for the Board of Immigration of Appeals (BIA), states that “[t]he [BIA] will not engage in de

1

Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Interdisciplinary and Comparative Perspectives 100 (S. Megal Berthold
& Kathryn R. Libal eds., 2019).
2

Id. at 101–02.

3

Id. at 100.

4

See generally Engy Abdelkader, Immigration in the Era of Trump: Jarring Social, Political, and Legal
Realities, 44 The Harbinger 76 (2020).
5

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 1, at 101–02.

6

See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 323 (A.G. 2018); Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 84, 84 (A.G.
2020).

3

novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge.” 7 However, “de novo”
review is not defined in this statute. 8 In September of 2020, Attorney General William Barr
elected to intervene in the case of Matter of A-C-A-A- to impose a novel understanding of de
novo review, requiring the government to “reconsider every aspect of an asylum application.”9
This means that even if asylees win their case at trial, they must “reprove everything again a
second time on appeals.”10 This article will argue that this holding is absurd and cruel. It will
also show how the decision is merely the latest iteration in the long-term fight over what asylum
law is for, what it does, and what it ought to do. By renewing emphasis on national security,
Attorney General Barr has imposed another undue burden on asylum applicants that is legally
unsound.11 This article will show the wisdom behind the original humanitarian aims of asylum,
explain how we have abandoned this humanitarianism in favor of exclusion, and recommend a
path towards future renewal of a just and fair American asylum process.
Part II of this article will explore the history of asylum policy and display its firm roots in
the aftermath of The Second World War, a rejection of eugenics, and an embrace of civil rights
and humane treatment of asylees. Part III will explore how the Department of Justice has
manipulated terms of art employed by immigration officials, stretching them to their breaking
point in order to restrict access to asylum and move toward a general policy of exclusion. Part
IV will explore in detail how the pendulum of asylum policy swung decisively in favor of

7

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007) (emphasis added).

8

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii–iii) (2007).

Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 84, 93 (A.G. 2020); Andrew Geibel, Attorney General’s Decision
Makes Matters Worse for Asylum Seekers, HIAS BLOG (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.hias.org/blog/attorney-generals-decision-makes-matters-worse-asylum-seekers
9

10

Geibel, supra note 9.

11

See generally Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (BIA 2018); Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec.
84, 93 (A.G. 2020).
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exclusion during the most recent tenures of Attorneys General Sessions and Barr. Part V will
argue against viewing this issue as one of pure legal formalism, and rather encourage seeing it as
part of a broader political project unjustly weaponizing legal formalism against asylum seekers.
Finally, Part VI will discuss possible solutions to bring asylum policy back to its purpose—
serving those at our borders seeking refuge from oppression.
II.

EXCLUSION vs. HUMANITARIANISM: THE HISTORY OF ASYLUM POLICY
A.

MCCARRAN-WALTER vs. HART-CELLER

Historically, concerns for national security often overtook concerns for human rights in
immigration law. In 1952, Congress enacted the first iteration of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), also known as the McCarran-Walter Act.12 It operated via a quota system
to allow only a few immigrants from nations without large existing U.S. populations.13 The U.S.
would only permit from each country up to 0.17% “of the number of inhabitants of the United
States who traced their ancestry to that country in 1920.”14 This favored continued immigration
from the northern European nations from which previous generations of Americans descended,
such as England, Germany, and Ireland, and limited or prevented immigration from other areas,
such as southern Europe, Asia, and Africa. 15

12

Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 51, 56 (1999). Congress intended this particular Act to help exclude migrants that
carried Communist sympathies from entering the United States. Id. While most of the racial elements of
this Act would later be replaced by the Hart-Celler Act, much of this policy remains in the U.S. Code
today. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1996).
13

Chin, supra note 12, at 279.

14

Id.

Id. at 280. Notably, the McCarran-Walter Act’s scheme did not count African Americans “for purposes
of awarding quotas to foreign nations” and restricted visas for countries that were colonies of European
powers, all but completely ceasing immigration to the U.S. from Africa. Id. at 280. Chin dismisses the
claim that the Hart-Celler Act can be blamed for the increase in immigration to the U.S. of Latino/a
immigrants. Id. at 280 n.24.
15

5

While the INA originated with exclusionary and racist aims, international and domestic
pressure would cause Congress to move away from those aims.16 In 1965, Congress adopted the
Hart-Celler Act, which amended the INA to “eliminat[e] the national-origins quotas” in favor of
categories selecting for marriage, high-skilled work, and other race- and national-origin-neutral
criteria.17 This was seen as the application of the Civil Rights movement to immigration law. 18
Its enactment came in the wake of The Second World War, the fall of Nazi Germany, the
rejection of the Holocaust’s aims, and the massive refugee spike that followed. 19 As the western
powers went through a period of decolonialization, newly freed peoples went to the United
Nations to speak about the importance of racial equality, and the U.S. “sustained international
criticism” for the policies of the McCarran-Walter Act.20 In short, the U.S. national origins
system “create[ed] an image of hypocrisy which [could] be exploited by those who [sought] to
discredit [America’s] professions of democracy.”21
The adoption of Hart-Celler also represented the adoption by the United States of the
meaning of refugee as it was understood in international law in those times. The U.S. imported
the U.N.’s definition of “refugee” into the U.S.C. nearly verbatim, 22 including the language

16

David S. FitzGerald & David Cook-Martin, The Geopolitical Origins of the U.S. Immigration Act of
1965, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/geopoliticalorigins-us-immigration-act-1965.
17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. The shift in the source of immigrants to the United States away from Europe and towards Latin
America is often attributed to the enactment of the INA of 1965. Id.
20

Id.

21

Id.

Kelly Karvelis, The Asylum Claim for Victims of Attempted Trafficking, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 273,
283–84 (2013).
22
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regarding “well-founded fear” and “membership in a particular social group.”23 While the INA
contains “little elaboration” on the meaning of these terms, Congressional intent illustrates that it
should be interpreted in accord with the UN’s wider understanding of refugee status. 24 The
United Nations adopted a similar definition in 1951, shortly following the end of the Second
World War.25 The Senate Committee meant the adoption of this definition in American law to
conform with that of the United Nations. 26 The treatment of refugees under international law at
the time was meant to be broad and responsive to the various forms the need for asylum may
take.27
If Hart-Celler represented a step away from exclusion and towards humanitarianism, then
this was reinforced by the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980. This Act came at the behest of
drafters who “were motivated chiefly by a sense of duty to combat human rights abuses around
the world.”28 It amended the INA to provide anyone who meets the above definition of
“refugee” a “statutory right to seek asylum.”29 This amendment reconfirmed Congress’s prior

23

Compare United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, 153 (stating that a refugee is one who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.”) (emphasis added), with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (stating, “[A]ny person
who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.”) (emphasis added).
24

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 283.

25

Id.

26

Id.

Id. at 284. “[T]he UNHCR’s depiction of ‘social group’ as a broad and adaptable term demonstrates
that Congress intended an equally expansive construction of the same term in the Refugee Act.” Id.
27

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 285. “The Refugee Act’s other objectives and the policies that it
implemented further illustrate an inclusive intention.” Id.
28

29

Id. at 283.
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intent to conform with the United Nations on refugee issues.30 Alongside increasing the number
of refugees the United States would admit, Congress established other procedures meant to
“assist emerging classes of refugees” and avoid excluding “deserving people because of arbitrary
standards.”31 Despite this prior intent, the United States quickly deviated from these goals and
diverged from the approach of other nations with similar goals.32
Starting in the 1990s, Congress would undertake a concerted shift in policy away from a
focus on humanitarianism and back towards a focus on national security and exclusion. 33 In
1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA), which established a novel system known as “expedited removal.”34 Expedited
removal is the process by which low-level immigration officers can quickly deport immigrants
from the United States without judicial review.35 The process applies to immigrants
apprehended “at [the] border” or who are “apprehended within two weeks of arrival and within
100 miles” of the border.36 Under expedited removal, the migrant bears the burden of proving

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 286–88.

33

A Primer on Expedited Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 22, 2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/primer-expedited-removal.
34

Id.

Id. The INA provides: “If an immigration officer determines that an alien who is arriving in the U.S. . .
. is inadmissible [either for misrepresentation of a material fact, misrepresentation of their status as an
immigrant, or lack of required documentation], the officer shall order the alien removed from the United
States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum .
. . or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
35

36

A Primer on Expedited Removal, supra note 33.
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they should be allowed a chance to argue for asylum,37—a requirement that some argue
constitutes a due process violation. 38
Congress enacted expedited removal with two goals—to keep fraudulent asylum
claimants from accessing the full asylum process, and to maintain access for “sincere asylum
seekers.”39 These goals, however, have proven contradictory as a focus on curbing “illegal”
immigration has prevented entry of many legitimate asylum claimants. 40 The expedited removal
process is “too abbreviated to eliminate weak claims without running a substantial risk of
returning bona fide refugees to persecution.”41 Expedited removal has raised concern from the
UNHCR, since it can lead to the United States “violating its obligations to protect refugees.”42
B.

THE LIVED ASYLUM PROCESS

On July 22, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security declared it would follow
President Trump’s directive to carry out expedited removal to its fullest extent. 43 Under the
current expedited removal process, a migrant will be immediately deported by the officer at hand
unless they either (1) “indicate[] . . . an intention to apply for asylum,” or (2) “a fear of
persecution.”44 Under either of these two situations, the immigration officer must “refer the alien

37

Deborah Anker, Bahar Khoshnoudi & Ron Rosenberg, Expedited Removal: Applying the Credible Fear
Standard, 21 In Defense of the Alien 193, 193 (1998).
38

A Primer on Expedited Removal, supra note 33. This argument stems primarily from the extreme
leeway given to low-level immigration officers on the ground, making them “prosecutor and judge.” Id.
Meanwhile, this “truncated process” means that there is a high error rate because courts are rarely able to
determine when a migrant may otherwise have been able to obtain relief with so short a timeframe. Id. In
2017, 35% of deportations were through the expedited removal process. Id.
39

Anker, supra note 37, at 195.

40

Id. at 196.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 195; see also Karvelis, supra note 22, at 283–84.

43

A Primer on Expedited Removal, supra note 32.

44

8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
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for an interview by an asylum officer.”45 During this interview, that asylum officer determines
whether the applicant has what is called a “credible fear of persecution.” 46 If “credible fear”47 is
shown, the migrant can avoid expedited removal, and receive the “full consideration” of their
asylum claim in a “standard removal hearing” before an immigration judge (IJ) at the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 48 Then they may appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), and finally may appeal to the federal circuit court where their case originated. 49
During this entire process, the asylum applicants remain detained. 50
Starting at the BIA stage, the court reviews questions of law de novo.51 The terms
“particular social group” and “well-founded fear of persecution” are questions of legal and
administrative interpretation because they are not defined in the INA.52 Therefore, these terms
have been reviewed and interpreted in multiple circuits.53 These judicial interpretations, as well
as the appropriate test for establishing a reasonable interpretation in the first place, have been
inconsistent and contradictory not just between circuits, but even within the same circuit. 54 One
result of this inconsistency has been hesitancy to apply the particular social group finding to

45

Id.

46

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).

47

See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v)

48

Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 1040 S.Ct. 1959 (2020) (quoting C.F.R. § 208.30(f)).

49

8 U.S.C. §§ 1240.15; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(2) (2012).

50

A Primer on Expedited Removal, supra note 33; see also Record Number of Asylum Cases in FY 2019,
TRAC IMMIGR. (January 8, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/ (noting the whole asylum
process, from application for asylum up to the time when an applicant finds out whether they will be
granted asylum, lasts an average of 1,030 days, or nearly three years).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii–iii) (2007). De novo means that the reviewing court gives “no deference to a
lower court’s findings.” Hearing de novo, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
51

52

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 275.

53

Id. at 283.

54

Id. at 275.
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domestic violence victims.55 The question is whether this is a failure of our government to avoid
excluding deserving asylum applicants due to arbitrary standards. Answering that question
requires inquiring into the historical understanding and purpose behind the “particular social
group” standard.
III.

THE SCOPE NARROWS: MANIPULATION OF KEY INA TERMS

A.

CREDIBLE FEAR

For an asylum applicant to succeed in their application, they must first undergo a
“credible fear interview,” where they must show a “credible fear of persecution” if returned to
their country of origin.56 By statute, a refugee has “credible fear of persecution” when there is a
“significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum.”57 In other words, whether the refugee is granted the opportunity
to have their case heard before a judge depends on whether the asylum officer first reviewing
their case believes what they say.58
The INA states that in deciding whether a migrant can “establish eligibility for asylum”
an IJ must take “into account the credibility” of that migrant. 59 For example, in Gomez-Zuluaga
v. Attorney General of U.S, the Third Circuit reviewed a case involving a migrant fleeing threats

55

Id.

56

Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 53; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
57

Pistone, supra note 56, at 57.

58

Id. at 54.

59

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
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of guerilla violence in Colombia.60 While denying refugee status on other grounds, the court
nevertheless agreed with the IJ that the migrant had established credible fear. 61 The migrant
declared that Colombian guerillas were “known to threaten, beat, rape, and sexually abuse
women,” accusations that were perfectly consistent with independent reports of such violence.62
These objective conditions, combined with the migrant’s subjective experiences, were enough
for the Third Circuit to consider her credible.63 In Canales-Vargas v. Gonzalez, considering a
migrant who had fled Peruvian guerillas after speaking out against them, the Ninth Circuit
similarly found the migrant credible where Peru’s objective history of guerilla violence matched
the migrant’s personal experiences.64
Even taking into consideration the law enforcement aims behind IIRIRA, there are
“various indications” that Congress intended credible fear to be “a low screening hurdle.” 65 The
UNHCR recommends IJs give a “benefit of the doubt” to applicants who meet “general
credibility” with “plausible” statements and not “counter to generally known facts.” 66 Congress

Gomez-Zuluaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 338 (3d Cir. 2008). While the applicant had credible
fear, the Court overturned the IJ’s determination that the applicant belonged to a “particular social group”
as protected under the INA, a controversy which will be discussed in detail later in this article. Id.
60

61

Id.

62

Id. at 348.

63

Id.

64

Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 744–76 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit at this time
applied a low threshold on this issue which has since been superseded by statutory requirements that an
asylum applicant “must establish that . . . political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). For our purposes on this
point, this distinction is immaterial.
65

Anker, supra note 36, at 196–97. The two main pieces of evidence Anker, Khoshnoudi, and Rosenberg
point to in support of this are (1) a statement to this effect from lead senatorial sponsor Senator Hatch, and
(2) the fact that the “final version of IIRIRA rejected a more stringent standard” which would have
required an inquiry into the claimant’s truthfulness. Id. (emphasis added).
66

Id. at 197. Notably, the BIA still recognizes that as a matter of law the credibility of the applicant is not
per se determinative of “credible fear,” but rather whether the content matches otherwise verifiable facts.
In Re E-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 860, 862 (B.I.A. 1997).
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wanted asylum officers to focus on the subjective fear, and not to “perform a detailed
determination” of asylum eligibility. 67 They were simply meant to determine “whether the
applicant’s fear appears to be sincere” and consistent with reality. 68 Despite this intent, asylum
officers frequently apply a more stringent review in the name of national security.69
Furthermore, IIRIRA limits judicial review of asylum officers’ decisions to merely “(A) whether
the petitioner is an alien, (B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under [the IIRIRA],
and (C) whether the petitioner can prove” that they were legally admitted “for permanent
residence” as a refugee, or granted asylum. 70 Asylum officers therefore receive great leeway and
little oversight in expedited removal, allowing it to be an effective tool for asylee exclusion.71
In 2020, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that IIRIRA’s limitations on review of
asylum decisions were unconstitutional violations of due process or the right to a writ of habeas
corpus.72 The case of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam involved Sri Lankan
migrant who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border, whereupon Border Patrol immediately

67

Anker, supra note 37, at 199.

68

Id. But see In Re N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312, 313 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that when the statutory
conditions leading to credible fear change, such that the original source of the feared persecution is no
longer present, the applicant bears the burden of showing credible fear on new grounds).
See generally Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of ‘National Security’ Rationale in Crafting U.S.
Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE LAW 749 (2005). Kerwin, Executive Director of
the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, heavily criticizes the misuse of national security rhetoric in the
shaping of asylum policy, including the characterization of asylum generally as a backdoor through which
the U.S. is left vulnerable to terrorist attack. Id. at 757. “National security” rhetoric has been misused to
“justify the interdiction, repatriation, and detention of . . . asylum-seekers.” Id. These and similar
policies “risk alienating” migrants and undermining the credibility of American values. Id. at 751, 763.
The anti-terrorism fight, he argues, would be “more likely to be won if the United States understands
[national] security to include adherence to its guiding values,” including the recognition of “refugee and
immigrant rights.” Id. at 763.
69

70

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).

71

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 410, 411 (2020).

72

Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. at 1964.
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apprehended him.73 The migrant, Thuraissigiam, fled Sri Lanka after the nation’s government
engaged in a “campaign of abduction and torture against Tamils,” Thuraissigiam’s ethnicity.74
Thuraissigiam argued that IIRIRA precluded all review for violations during a credible fear
interview, even for clearly unreasonable failures, such as “refus[al] to conduct an interview
altogether or to provide translation,” or even when asylum officers “based their decisions on race
or religion.”75 The Ninth Circuit held that IIRIRA “did not provide a meaningful opportunity for
review of Thuraissigiam’s claims,” violating his right to petition the government for a writ of
habeas corpus under the United States Constitution.76
The Supreme Court disagreed.77 First of all, the Court emphasized both IIRIRA’s
interest in crafting “a system for weeding out patently meritless claims and expeditiously
removing” such migrants, and reducing overall costs.78 The Court reiterated a common theme
among national-security-minded jurists, characterizing “credible fear” as something to be
asserted “in the hope of a lengthy asylum process that will enable [the claimants] to remain in the
United States for years.”79 This concern favors what the Court calls a “century-old rule” that the
“power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative,” arguing the Constitution therefore
gives “plenary authority” to the “political department of the government.” 80 In other words, the
President, through his Cabinet, and Congress, by the will of the people, have the right to refuse

73

Id. at 1967.

74

Brief for Respondent at 4, Thuraissigiam, 1040 S.Ct. 1959 (No. 19–161).

75

Id.

76

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, supra note 71, at 412.

77

Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. at 1983.

78

Id. at 1963.

79

Id. at 1966 n.9.

80

Id. at 1982.
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due process to refugees seeking asylum in the United States. What Thuraissigiam suffered upon
entry was therefore not an “unlawful executive detention,” and, in the eyes of the Court, the
IIRIRA correctly refused to grant him asylum in the United States.81 “[T]he Government,” wrote
Justice Alito for the Court, “is happy to release him—provided the release occurs in the cabin of
a plane bound for Sri Lanka.”82
The Harvard Law Review note on Thuraissigiam in 2020 points out the clear
implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling, as well as the lack of clarification for much of the
Court’s reasoning.83 Following the lead of the Trump administration’s anti-migrant agenda, the
sweeping Thuraissigiam holding “deepens the impact of an increasingly stringent immigration
regime.”8485 The Harvard Law Review finally points out that the “methodological confusion”
stemming from Thuraissigiam “further entrench[es] the increasingly expansive, ‘shadowy
regime’ of expedited removal.”86
B.

PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

When Congress adopted the Refugee Act of 1980 to amend the INA, it did not
substantially change the definition of “refugee” imported from the United Nations. 87 It still
included those persons of whatever nationality who are “persecuted” or have “a well-founded

81

Id. at 1970–71.

82

Id. at 1970.

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, supra note 71 at 415. Despite “anchoring” its
holding in an originalist interpretation, the Court nevertheless included in its analysis the application of
more recent case law “without clarifying its reasoning or the weight of this body of law.” Id. Much of
this note’s criticism of the Court is based on its inconsistent application of an originalist interpretation.
83

84

Id.

85

Id. at 419.

86

Id.

87

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 283.

15

fear of persecution” because they are “in a particular social group.” 88 Unfortunately, the Refugee
Act did not define “particular social group,” despite requiring it to be the “central reason” for
persecution.89 However, it is historically clear that the UNHCR, from whom the INA adopted its
definition, intended the term to be broad.90 A broad application was not meant to weaken law
enforcement or interfere with a sovereign’s territorial integrity, but to make sure law can adapt to
new situations creating new “classes of refugees.”91 In recent years, the executive branch has
gone on to narrow the meaning of “particular social group,” such that the term no longer serves
its original purpose. The narrow interpretation is used to exclude valid refugee and asylum
claims in violation of the purposes of the INA.
i.

IMMUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS

In the case of Matter of Acosta, the BIA made one of its first attempts to define the term
“particular social group,” adding the requirement of immutability. 92 A characteristic is
considered immutable if it is either “beyond the power of an individual to change or is so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.” 93
Applying the judicial interpretation theory of esjudem generis,94 the BIA determined that each of
the enumerated grounds (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion) had a single
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

89

Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)(i).

90

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 284; see also supra Section II.A.

91

Karvelis, supra note 22, at 285.

92

Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).

93

Id.

Id. The doctrine of esjudem generis (literally “of the same kind”) guides courts to consider “general
words used in an enumeration with specific words” to be “construed in a manner consistent with the
specific words.” Id.
94
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characteristic in common: they are each an “immutable characteristic.” 95 The BIA further
explained that the characteristic need not be innate, such as sex or skin color, but could also be a
“shared past experience.”96 For example, the Court named “former military leadership or land
ownership” as examples of groups that would qualify under this definition. 97 It is important to
keep in mind that “immutability” does not mean in this context that the trait is somehow
unchangeable. The interest being preserved here is one of justice; it would be unjust to permit
persecution on account of something that, “as a matter of conscience,” the person should not be
expected or required to abandon.98
The applicant in Matter of Acosta claimed to be one of a group of taxi drivers opposing
certain guerilla groups by refusing to cooperate with guerilla-sponsored work stoppages.99 The
Court did not consider this group to involve “immutable characteristics” because they could have
either “chang[ed] jobs or cooperat[ed] in work stoppages.” 100 This is an example of a limitation
on the definition of “particular social group,” but the BIA did not preclude the possibility of asof-yet unknown groups which fit this definition. Rather, they require that for a finding of

Id. Since the INA lists as grounds for persecution “race,” “religion,” “nationality,” and “political
opinion,” all of which are immutable characteristics, the fifth ground of “particular social group” must
also be one that shares an immutable characteristic. Id.
95

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 234.

100

Id. The BIA here considered the argument that since this case involves what amounts to a decision
between his ability to make a living and his bodily safety (as he was dealing with militant groups), this
was a trait for which they should not, “as a matter of conscience,” be persecuted, and therefore
functionally serves as an “immutable trait.” Id. The BIA first argued since the international definition of
“refugee” does not “guarantee an individual a right to work in the job of his choice,” they infer from this
conclusion the applicant was “able by his own actions to avoid the persecution of the guerrillas.” Id.
This of course ignores the material realities facing those who must make such decisions between their
deeply held political views and their bodily safety, which is cause enough to question exactly what
individuals the BIA thinks asylum law serves.
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particular social group, the applicant “either cannot change [the trait,] or should not be required
to change [the trait] because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”101
ii.

LARGE PERSECUTED GROUPS

Courts also focus on the size of the social group being considered, even when such a
consideration cuts against clear persecution. This is best exemplified in the holding of Rreshpja
v. Gonzales, where an asylum applicant argued that her persecution was due to being an
“attractive young woman who risk[ed] being kidnapped and forced into prostitution if she
return[ed] to Albania.”102 The Sixth Circuit held that this group failed to meet the INA
requirements of “particular social group” for two reasons: (1) the group was seen as a
“generalized, sweeping classification,” and (2) “a social group may not be circularly defined by
the fact that it suffers persecution.”103 Both holdings cause serious conceptual problems for
courts’ understanding of what a particular social group is and what function it serves in the INA.
First of all, the idea that “generalized, sweeping classifications” are mutually exclusive
with the definition of “particular social group” is unfounded because it ignores how often
societies persecute groups that are sweepingly large and generalized in the abstract. 104 The
101

Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N at 233. The BIA soon drew another line barring credible fear determination
for a migrant claiming to have escaped persecution by guerillas due to being a former state policeman.
Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658, 660 (B.I.A. 1988). This is comparable to the taxi drivers, because
the officers could theoretically resign; however, the BIA here pointed out that “[v]irtually all participants
on either side of an armed struggle could be characterized as ‘persecutors.’” Id. Size of the group in
question is not dispositive, but one cannot read these cases without realizing that from the beginning, size
did matter to the BIA’s reasoning; the bigger the candidate group, at least in theory, the less likely the
BIA is to permit a finding of a particular social group.
102

Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2005).

103

Id. at 555–56.

See generally Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer & Hillary Rich, A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, “Particular
Social Group,” and Chevron, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345 (Winter 2019). Kelley-Widmer and
Rich call the idea that a group is “inherently deficient” under the INA for being too large “arbitrary and
unexamined.” Id. at 395 (quoting De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2020)). These
authors explain that, applying esjudem generis again, since eligible groups based on race, religion, and
nationality “typically refer to large classes of persons,” particular social groups also often refer to large
104
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Rreshpja holding contradicted by a holding that same year from the Ninth Circuit in Mohammad
v. Gonzales.105 In Mohammad, the court considered whether the group “Somalian females,” who
suffered forced genital mutilation, met the definition of “particular social group” for asylum
purposes.106 The court concluded that according to a “logical application of our law” it was
clearly reasonable that women of a certain nationality fall within the definition of “particular
social group.”107 In fact, given the pervasiveness of forced female genital mutilation in Somalia,
the applicant could successfully have claimed membership in the broad group of all “Somalian
females,” or “young girls” from her particular tribe; either would have rightly been a basis to
claim asylum.108 Sex is clearly an “innate characteristic” that is “fundamental to individual
identity.”109 This innate characteristic is furthermore the “motivating factor—if not a but-for
cause—of [their] persecution.”110
If the Sixth Circuit in Rreshpja applied the Ninth’s reasoning, “young, attractive
Albanian women” could reasonably meet the definition of particular social group as much as
“Somalian women” did. 111 Instead, whether “virtually all of the women in Somalia” could

groups, and therefore “particular social group cannot be limited by its size.” Id. at 395–96. To put a finer
point on it, if an important reason to reject asylum eligibility was that the group is large, that would have
excluded asylum for Jews escaping Nazi Germany and Tutsis fleeing the Rwandan genocide, both very
large groups. Id. at 395 n.374 (citing Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
105

See generally Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Id. at 796–97.

107

Id. at 797.

108

Id. at 796–97.

109

Id. at 797.

110

Id. at 798.

Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556. The Sixth Circuit argued the Rreshpja applicant “did not introduce any
evidence” that human trafficking of “young, attractive Albanian women” pervaded Albanian society as
much as forced female genital mutilation pervaded Somalian society. Id. at 555–56. However, it should
be noted that the court in Mohammad allowed the applicant to file a motion arguing “prior counsel . . .
fail[ed] to raise the issue of female genital mutilation,” and appended “a report on female genital
mutilation from the [WHO].” Mohammad, 400 F.3d at 789–91. The record does not indicate whether the
111
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constitute a cognizable group bothered the Sixth Circuit.112 The court missed the legally
significant point: “Somalian females” suffered persecution because they were “Somalian
females.” The Ninth Circuit recognized the only way a Somalian woman could avoid forced
genital mutilation would be to either stop being female (an immutable trait) or leave Somalia.
Similarly, if the applicant in Rreshpja had brought evidence to prove the pervasiveness of
trafficking of “young, attractive Albanian women,” that would meet the definition of particular
social group, regardless of what the Sixth Circuit said.113
iii.

VISIBLY PERSECUTED GROUPS

The BIA modified their understanding of “particular social group” in the case of In Re CA- by discussing and imposing the “visibility” requirement, which states that the group in
question must be “highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in question.” 114 The
BIA considered whether “noncriminal informants” were a “particular social group” when
victimized for their activities by a drug cartel.115 The BIA did not consider this a particular
social group for two reasons. First, they considered the group “too loosely” defined to be
sufficiently particularized. 116 Second, they did not consider the group “visible.”117 Therefore, on
remand, the BIA considered a narrower group identity—“noncriminal drug informants working

applicant in Rreshpja had a similar opportunity. Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 555–57. However, had one been
provided, she could have provided significant evidence that human trafficking was endemic in Albania
and that their government was unable or unwilling to “fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking.” Country Narratives: Countries A Through F, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., (2010),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142759.htm.
112

Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 554, 555.

113

Id. at 554–56.

114

In Re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).

115

Id. at 957.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 959–61.
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against the Cali drug cartel.”118 For one to be an effective police informant, the BIA reasoned,
they must be incognito and therefore not “visible” for asylum purposes.119 The majority of
circuits subsequently adopted these “particularity” and “visibility” requirements. 120
As is often the case, the judicial branch disagreed with the executive branch’s logic. In
addition, the holding of In Re C-A- was rightly challenged in the Seventh Circuit case of Benitez
Ramos v. Holder.121 There, the Seventh Circuit reversed a BIA decision which, “[i]n a
characteristically terse, one-member opinion,” held that former Salvadoran gang members who
bore tattoos marking them for ostracization could not be a particular social group in part due to a
lack of “social visibility.”122 The court agreed that being a gang member does not, on its own,
constitute a particular social group. 123 However, they disagreed that lacking “social visibility”
should be a basis for their exclusion, especially if its definition requires that “a complete stranger
could identify you as a member if he encountered you in the street.” 124 Simply, the Seventh

118

Id. at 957.

Id. at 960. Several years later in 2014, in Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA would clarify that “social
visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility,” using the analogy of a religious group that is not “visible by
sight.” 26 I&N Dec. 208, 216–17 (B.I.A. 2014). This clarification would seem to cut against the
reasoning that police informants were not “visible” in part because they remain “unknown and
undiscovered.” In Re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 960. Nevertheless, the BIA in Matter of W-G-R- doubled
down on this reasoning, saying that it is “consistent with [their] prior decisions involving claims of
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.” 26 I&N Dec. at 218. This
clarification was arguably in response to criticisms we will discuss from, for example, the Seventh
Circuit, which asks “whether the [BIA] is using the term ‘social visibility’ in the literal sense . . . or evenwhether it understands the difference.” Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
119
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Kenneth Ludlum, Defining Membership in a Particular Social Group, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 130
(2015).
121

Benitez-Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430.
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Id. at 429. Part of the decision was due to Benitez Ramos regarding withholding for removal and not
asylum, but regarding our discussion of the nuances of “particular social group,” this distinction is
immaterial. Id. at 431.
123

Id.

124

Id. at 430.
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Circuit decried the short-sightedness of a doctrine recognizing the existence of “redheads,” but
not “veterans” because the former is visible whereas the latter, despite more persecution, is
not.125
iv.

CIRCULARITY: IDENTITY THROUGH PERSECUTION

The “non-circularity” rule requirement, which states that “under the [INA] a ‘particular
social group’ must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum,”
possibly creates the most unreasonable barrier to successfully establishing a particular social
group.126 In Castellano-Chacon v. INS, the Sixth Circuit characterized the BIA’s approach as a
question primarily concerned with whether the group is “externally distinguishable.” 127 They
stated, citing prior BIA decisions, “society’s reaction to a ‘group’ may provide evidence” of that
group’s existence, but only “as long as the reaction by persecutors to members of a particular
social group is not the touchstone defining the group.”128 The BIA, therefore, claims to want to
know how the group is seen in its own society to understand the basis on which the persecutors

125

Id. To employ a modified and paraphrased version of the analogy the court used, the Soviet Union
under Stalin persecuted “bourgeoisie”—comprising middle-class owners of businesses, land, and
capital—by taking their property and often killing them. Id. at 431. Meanwhile, in most other societies,
such as the United States, which certainly have owners of businesses, land, and capital, people do not
cognize the presence of a “bourgeoisie.” Id. However, if these societies adopted an ideology which
aimed to collectivize private property, as the Soviet Union did in the 1920s, they would, in essence,
create a group of dispossessed individuals that could collectively be identified by the word “bourgeoisie.”
Id. In other words, persecution can create “visibility” such that a “particular social group” is only created
because of its persecution and not the other way around. The BIA would deny asylum for such a
“bourgeois” person running away from such a society under the In Re C-A- understanding of “visibility.”
Id. at 431.
126

Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003).

127

Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by
Almuhtaseb v. Gonzalez, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006).
128

Id.
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themselves identify the group. 129 To put it another way, a “particular social group” is a “group
of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.” 130
This rule is unreasonable because it ignores the realities of persecution. In Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, the Third Circuit ruled against asylum for an applicant who testified that, as an escaped
child soldier in the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), he faced punishment from both the
Ugandan government and the LRA if he returned.131 For his asylum application, the applicant
Lukwago identified the persecuted social group as “children from Northern Uganda who are
abducted and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude to the LRA.” 132 The
applicant not only offered testimony but also documentary evidence to show “that the LRA
[systematically] targets children for abduction.”133 Regardless, the Court was not convinced he
was persecuted due to membership in this group.134 They instead reasoned the LRA did not
exclusively target the group as described, but alongside multiple groups effected by atrocities,
and therefore was not persecution on account of the group.135

129

Id. at 548.

130

Id. (citing U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002)); see also
Lushaj v. Holder, 380 F. App’x 41 (2d Cir. 2010) (where “young women in Albania” was not considered
a “particular social group” because of this “circularity” problem).
131

Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164–65.
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Id. at 172.
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Id.

134

Id. at 183.

Id. at 172–73. The Third Circuit explained, “most of those abducted are between 13 and 16 years old.
Younger children are generally not strong enough to carry weapons or heavy loads while older children
are less malleable to the will of their abductors.” Id. The court admitted these conditions and worse were
“very well documented.” Id. This evidence alone shows the falsity in the Third Circuit’s holding;
children in this age range were explicitly targeted for a combination of ability to do the work of a child
soldier and malleability to their abductors’ will. Id. They were therefore clearly targeted on account of
their age.
135
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The non-circularity rule is misguided considering the aim of asylum law—safety for
those fleeing persecution. Following the rule’s logic, it is possible to characterize any oppressed
group with or without circularity, creating two groups containing identical persons, but with one
obtaining asylum, and the other not, based solely on the language used to define them. In 2020,
the Ninth Circuit identified this problem with a thought experiment about “[l]eft-handed
people.”136 Left-handedness is an immutable characteristic, defined with particularity,
representing a significant portion of the population, but not a particular social group under the
current INA interpretations because it is not a trait American society considers to “set apart the
group in a meaningful way.”137 Hypothetically, if the U.S. adopted a policy persecuting lefthandedness, this persecution would suddenly grant left-handed people social visibility. 138 Yet
the “formulation” of the particular social group “makes all the difference to the group’s
cognizability” if the fact that it “include[s] mention of feared harm” means that it “cannot exist
independently of that harm.”139 Therefore, if hypothetically an asylum officer characterized the
group as “left-handed people who have been persecuted,” that would not qualify as a particular
social group for violating the rule against circularity. 140 A different officer could articulate that
same group as persecuted because of their left-handedness, suddenly avoiding the circularity
rule. Courts should not allow such linguistic manipulation to change a claim’s outcome without
changing the claim’s substance. 141
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Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2020).

137

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1084.
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Id.
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In 2015, Kenneth Ludlum identified Cece v. Holder, a holding out of the Seventh Circuit, which he
believed could be the basis for resolving this problem by returning asylum law to a “uniform and
consistent set of standards that properly adheres to the INA and international law alike.” Kenneth
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By 2013, identifying a particular social group involved looking for a group with an
“immutable characteristic,” which was not so “loosely defined” as to be “sweeping” or
“generalized,” but was “visible,” or already socially identified in an applicant’s country of origin,
and which was not defined “with circularity,” meaning the identity of that group must be
independent of the persecution itself.142 We have discussed the potential problems with each
element of this definition and must now turn our attention to the consequences of its application
under the context of recent and troubling holdings from the BIA.
C.

A RETURN TO FOCUS: MATTER OF A-C-R-G-

In 2014, the BIA recognized that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship” could, depending on the particular facts, constitute a particular social group. 143
The applicants in Matter of A-R-C-G- suffered violence in Guatemala that included beatings,
burnings, threat of death, stalking, and rape. 144 Despite victims’ efforts to involve the police,
Guatemalan law enforcement refused to “interfere in a marital relationship,” and the victim
believed that if she returned her husband would kill her.145 The IJ on the case did not believe the
victim carried her burden of demonstrating eligibility for asylum, without considering the

Ludlum, Defining Membership in a Particular Social Group, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 125, 135 (2015).
The Seventh Circuit in Cece considered the BIA’s conclusion that a social group was not cognizable
because it was “defined in large part by the harm inflicted” and did not “exist independently of” those
committing the harm to be “not a reasoned conclusion.” Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir.
2013). Rather than declare that “gender alone can for the basis of a social group,” the Seventh Circuit
ultimately held that a “particular social group” can be “defined by gender plus one or more narrowing
characteristics.” Id. at 676. Unfortunately, many courts have not adopted this standard, which has
impacted a string of recent cases.
142

See supra Sections III.B (i–iv).
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Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388–89 (2014).
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Id.
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Id.
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conditions of abuse she endured to be “persecution.” 146 Rather, the IJ characterized them as
“criminal acts” committed “arbitrarily” and “without reason.”147 The BIA disagreed with this
determination, relying on empirical evidence to determine that such acts of violence were
reinforced by “societal expectations about gender and subordination.” 148 Despite the fact that her
husband abused her, something with which law enforcement refused to interfere, the IJ did not
consider her abuse to be “on account of” her being a “married woman in Guatemala who was
unable to leave the relationship.”149 Furthermore, the IJ relied in part on the fact that her
husband was not shown to have abused her “in order to overcome” her being a member of that
group, essentially imposing an extra material element to the case. 150
The BIA rightly reversed A-R-C-G-, finding the elements for a particular social group
met.151 First, sex is already considered a “common immutable characteristic.”152 Matter of A-RC-G- involved a group identified as women, with the additional characteristics of being married
and unable to leave their relationships. 153 Considering the victim’s experiences, as well as
background information and evidence, the BIA concluded the victim was a member of a
“particular,” “socially distinct” group, recognized in Guatemalan society, whose “discrete and
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Id. at 390.

Id.; Contra Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[w]hile a single
incident in some cases may not rise to the level of persecution” under the INA, “the cumulative effect of
several incidents may constitute persecution,” even when the applicant cannot necessarily prove a
“pattern or practice . . . of persecution” in their native society.).
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See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 393.
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Id. at 389.
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Id. at 389–90.
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Id. at 388–89.
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Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (1985); see also Cece, 733 F.3d at 666 (holding sex can form
the basis of a particular social group as long as it is accompanied by at least one other factor so as not to
be circular).
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Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 388–89.
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definable” boundaries were expressed in the words “married,” “women,” and “unable to leave
the relationship.”154 This BIA reversal was a return to the main purpose of asylum law: to apply
broad rules to determine asylum in order to attain humane ends, not to apply increasingly
exclusive rules to deny sanctuary to persons fleeing persecution. However, if the BIA’s decision
here represented progress, they would regress yet again under the guidance of Attorney General
Sessions.155
IV.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS: EXCLUSION UNDER ATTORNEYS GENERAL
SESSIONS AND BARR
A.

NO NEW GROUPS: MATTER OF A-B-

The Matter of A-B- applicant was a Salvadoran woman who fled years of domestic
violence from her partner, which she claimed included physical, emotional, and sexual abuse. 156
The particular social group she identified herself with was that of “El Salvadoran women who
are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common.” 157 The IJ
originally denied the asylum claim on these facts, and the applicant appealed that decision to the
BIA.158 The BIA found the IJ’s determination “clearly erroneous” and granted asylum in
December of 2016, finding the applicant met their burden of proving particular social group and
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Id. at 393.

155

Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (B.I.A. 2018).

156

Id. at 320–21.
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Id. at 321.

Id. “The immigration judge denied the respondent’s asylum claim for four independent reasons: (1)
the respondent was not credible; (2) the group in which she claimed membership did not qualify as a
‘particular social group’ within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); (3) even if it did, the
respondent failed to establish that her membership in a social group was a central reason for the
persecution; and (4) she failed to show that the El Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to help
her.” Id.
158
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overturning the prior decision.159 Attorney General Sessions disagreed, elected to take this case
under his own consideration pursuant to his powers as Attorney General, and overruled Matter of
A-R-C-G-.160
Sessions’ frustration with Matter of A-R-C-G- lay with its establishment of a “broad new
category of cognizable particular social groups,” including “Central American domestic violence
victims.”161 He believed Matter of A-R-C-G- wrongly created “an expansive new category of
particular social groups based on private violence” as opposed, in his opinion, to broader societal
conditions.162 He decried the BIA’s application of this precedent as consisting of “only two
sentences,” calling the holding “conclusory.”163 The BIA did not, he argued, “perform the
necessary legal and factual analysis,” and “fail[ed] meaningfully to consider” whether the
applicant “met her burden” of showing a particular social group or whether “respondent’s
persecution was on account of her membership in that group.” 164 He further believed that the
BIA “gave insufficient deference to the factual findings of the immigration judge.” 165 Sessions

Id. The court found the group at issue here to be “substantially similar” to “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” Id.; Matter of A-R-C-G, 26 I&N Dec. at 390.
159

160

Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 340.

Id. at 332. Interestingly, Sessions claims that “the [BIA] has articulated a consistent understanding of
the term ‘particular social group.’” Id. at 331. This is controverted by a cursory exploration of this term’s
historical development and ever-changing meaning. See supra §§ III.B.i–iv. Sessions tries to explain this
confused semantic history by blaming the BIA itself, arguing “not all of its opinions have properly
applied that framework.” Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 331 (emphasis added).
161
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Id. at 319.
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Id. at 332.
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Id. at 319–20.
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Id. at 320.

28

agreed with the IJ’s decision to overturn the BIA holding.166 If the BIA had considered the facts
more closely, he argued, it would have also agreed.167
Sessions applied the circularity rule again to conclude that the group in Matter of A-Bwas not “cognizable” to Guatemalan society. 168 In dicta Sessions explains that since domestic
and gang violence victims are likely large, “diffuse” groups, they could not form a particular
social group.169 However, Sessions himself knew the BIA had evidence of Guatemala’s “culture
of machismo and family violence,” and that local police “often failed to respond to requests for
assistance related to domestic violence,” rendering local domestic violence laws worth little
more than the paper they were printed on.170 In a show of either ignorance or deliberate
disregard for the historic aim of asylum law, Sessions disregarded Guatemala’s status quo,
inexplicably declaring these facts to neither evince nor explain how “Guatemalan society
perceives, considers, or recognizes ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship’ to be a distinct social group.” 171
Naturally, Matter of A-B- was the subject of much criticism and debate. For example,
Cornell Law Professor Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer called this holding not only “a source of [public]
concern and outrage,” but also “legally concerning.” 172 Sessions not only considered whether a
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Id.

167

Id.

Id. at 334–35. Despite each part of the proposed group’s definition clearly being identifiable in
Guatemala, their collection could not itself be “defined with particularity” because it did not “exist
independently” of the “harm asserted.” Id. at 334.
168

Id. at 335. “A particular social group must avoid, consistent with the evidence, being too broad to
have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger significance in society.” Id. at 336.
169
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Id. at 336.
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Id.
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Kelley-Widmer, supra note 104, at 403.
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group met the particular social group definition, but applied the holding generally to “victim[s]
of private criminal activity.”173 He imposed obligations on victims of society-wide, implicitlystate-sanctioned, violence to clear “higher hurdles” to get asylum.174 The “unilateral expansion
of some and contraction of other requirements” is an example of “agency overreach” and should
be understood as such by reviewing courts.175 Finally, and most importantly, she identifies
Sessions’ holding as part of a wider project “to attack particular social group cases involving
asylum seekers from Central America,” one that has continued to this day.176
Professor Kelley-Widmer’s work is also useful to critique the recent Attorneys General’s
handling of asylum law. Her explanation of the “nebulousness” of INA terms of art shows a
fundamental mismatch between asylum legal theory and the material reality facing asylees. 177
For example, she argues that whereas courts see “race” under the INA as a scientific
classification, they should instead recognize it for what it is: “a social phenomenon of
stigmatization” causing the “subjective position where collective identities are social constructs
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Id. at 363.

174

Id. at 403.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 403–04. Professor Kelley-Widmer attacks Matter of A-B- under the Chevron test, which sets out
a two-step analysis for determining whether courts should afford deference to an agency’s interpretation
of an ambiguous statute, or whether they should consider it unlawful as “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” Id. at 365–66; see also generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Attorney General Sessions argued courts should apply Chevron
deference to his interpretation of “ambiguous provisions in the immigration laws” because “every court of
appeals” considers the term “particular social group . . . inherently ambiguous.” Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N
Dec. at 326–27. Professor Kelley-Widmer argues this deference should not apply here because Sessions’
interpretation of “particular social group” is “arbitrary.” Kelley-Widmer, supra note 104, at 381.
177

Kelley-Widmer, supra note 104, at 355–56, 374. Recall that refugees under the INA are those unable
or unwilling to return to their country of origin due to “fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2013).
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dependent upon variable perceptions.”178 On the other hand, she points out courts recognize
religions even when they lack “formal requirements for membership,” or any “doctrine, symbol,
hierarchy, [or] deity;” religions can be so loosely defined that courts must consider their “societal
persecution or discrimination” in order to understand their “boundaries.” 179 Finally, courts
consider the “political context” of the home country to determine “political opinion” for asylum
purposes, a determination that includes widely varied groups leaving vastly different
circumstances.180 These categories all share two important features: they are “meant to be
interpreted broadly,” and are defined based on the home country’s social context. 181 Context
may include novel persecution, with no historical analogy, from the state itself or from groups
the state is unable or unwilling to control.182 Therefore the United Nations embraces broadness
and flexibility to more readily apply asylum, and continues to criticize the “restrictive
perspective endorsed by Attorney General Sessions in A-B-.”183
B.

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS: GRACE v. BARR

Grace v. Barr illustrates a new and major push against this restrictive perspective. 184
Attorney General Barr, the successor to Sessions, denied asylum for a dozen Central American
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Kelley-Widmer, supra note 104, at 375.

179

Id. at 375–77. For example, Professor Kelley-Widmer points to Falun Gong, widely understood and
legally treated as a religion despite not considering itself as such and having no signs of membership. Id.
at 376. What makes Falun Gong a religion is their persecution by the Chinese government as a religion.
Id. at 376–77. Additionally, courts have defined “[n]ationality” in terms as broad and vague as those
defining many rejected candidates for “particular social group.” Id. at 378.
180

Id. at 378–80.

181

Id. at 380.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 393.

184

Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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migrants fleeing domestic and gang-related violence in their home countries. 185 Barr removed
them from the United States despite asylum officers finding their applications credible. 186
Therefore, the asylum seekers sought review of their applications arguing that certain BIA
policies were “arbitrary and capricious.”187 The court reviewed four policies: (1) requiring the
country of origin’s government condone or be unable to stop the persecution, (2) requiring
asylum officers to apply the law of the district where they conduct credible fear interviews,
rather than the law most favorable to the asylum seeker, (3) the circularity rule, and (4)
Sessions’s guidance that migrants’ claims “pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence
perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” 188 The D.C. Circuit found
each of these “raise the bar for demonstrating a credible fear of persecution far above what
Congress intended.”189 Nevertheless, the Court could only reverse policies found to be “arbitrary
and capricious”190; namely, the first two policies. 191

185

Id. at 890.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 890–91.

Id. at 890 (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320.). Sessions’s statement goes on: “While I do
not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum
or withholding application based on membership in a particular social group, in practice such claims are
unlikely to satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or
unwilling to address.” Id.
188

189

Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 887.

190

Id. The standard of review in this case did not come from Chevron; these policies are not based on
INA interpretations, but interpretations of precedent from the BIA, Attorneys General, and various
appellate courts. Id. at 896–97; see Kelley-Widmer supra, note 176 (discussing the Chevron analysis).
Rather, the D.C. Circuit applied a “narrow standard of review” from the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), asking whether such policies are “arbitrary and capricious.” Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 897. In
other words, the court “is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but instead [should] assess
only whether [such policies were] based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.” Id. This higher standard limited the extent to which the Court could
amend Sessions’ decisions.
Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 900. “[W]e have no choice but to find the [condoned-or-completelyhelpless] standard arbitrary and capricious.” Id. “[T]he new choice-of-law policy is arbitrary and
191

32

First, the court held the “condoned-or-completely-helpless standard” was “arbitrary and
capricious.”192 The rule’s language differs from the plain meaning of credible fear in the INA,
which states the home country’s government must be “unwilling or unable” to protect asylum
applicants.193 To illustrate this point, consider a case where local law enforcement officers
honestly try to solve a murder, but systematic corruption makes the government unwilling to
investigate, meaning local law enforcement is unable to bring the crime to justice.194 This
corruption is one of the kinds of persecution Congress intends the INA to serve.195 A
“condoned-or-completely-helpless standard” would however bar such a claim because, rather
than condoning or being helpless, law enforcement tried to investigate the crime and would have
but for the corruption.196
Second, the court held the new policy of applying the law of the circuit where the
credible fear interview took place to be arbitrary and capricious.197 Previous policy required
application of “the [statutory] interpretation most favorable to the applicant.”198 The Grace
applicants argued the new policy “represents a dramatic, unacknowledged, and unexplained
departure from years of prior agency practice,” and the court agreed. 199 The new policy posed a

capricious due to USCIS’s failure to acknowledge and explain its departure from past practice.” Id. at
903.
192

Id. at 898.

193

Id. at 898–99; 8 U.S.C. § 1158.

194

Id. at 899 (citing Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 159 (1st Cir. 2018)).

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

Id. at 903.

198

Id. at 900 (citing USCIS, Lesson Plan: Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations 17
(Feb. 13, 2017), J.A. 379 (“Lesson Plan”)).
199

Id. at 900–01 (citing Appellees’ Br. 30).
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threat to asylum applicants, who previously enjoyed “the benefit of the doubt” of the “most
favorable circuit law” and were “treated equally across circuits because officers applied
nationally uniform guidance.”200 Without that protection, asylum applicants in one state can face
deportation under facts that would have secured asylum for them in another state.201 This
arbitrariness would vitiate one of the purposes of the INA: “that individuals with valid asylum
claims are not returned to countries where they could face persecution.” 202
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the BIA on the latter two issues. Discussing a
critique similar to that developed earlier in this article,203 the D.C. Circuit points out the social
group identified—“El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships
where they have children in common with their partners”—appears circular only when defined
by the harm of being “unable to leave.”204 But that same group may not be circular where the
harm of being “unable to leave” results from circumstances in their native society.205 The court
recognized the problem of abstracting these issues out of reality into a mere issue of linguistic
definition, stating “whether a given group is circular depends on the facts of the particular
case.”206 Nevertheless, the Court’s limited power on review bound its holding; it challenged
neither the circularity rule itself nor the Matter of A-B- precedent.207 Since the BIA was merely

200

Id. at 901.

201

Id.

202

Id. at 902–03.

203

Supra Section III.B.iv.

204

Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 904 (citing A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 321).
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Id. Examples of such circumstances may include divorce being illegal or limited, the state refusing to
enforce laws limiting domestic violence, or others. Id.
206

Id.

207

Id.
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applying precedent, it did not abuse its discretion, whatever the wisdom of the precedent may
be.208
The Court’s final consideration, and the second BIA holding affirmed, regarded
application of the “particular social group” standard. 209 Attorney General Sessions set down
“guidance” in Matter of A-B- stating “claims based on membership in a . . . particular social
group defined by the members’ vulnerability to harm of domestic violence or gang violence
committed by non-government actors will not establish the basis for asylum, refugee status, or a
credible fear or reasonable fear of persecution.” 210 The D.C. District Court originally held this
“guidance” constituted a “categorical ban,” whereby decisions to remove the applicants would
not revolve around the facts of each situation, and therefore constituted “arbitrary and
capricious” policy. 211 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, rejecting applicants’ argument that this
guidance constituted a de facto rule.212 In support of this holding, the court stated the guidance
only applied “generally,” had “limited exceptions,” and had language guiding asylum officers on
the ground to perform a case-by-case analysis.213 Therefore, the court concluded, the guidance
did not constitute a “rule.”214

208

Id. at 904–05.

209

Id. at 906.

210

Id. at 905 (citing USCIS, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and
Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B- 1, PM–602–0162 (July 11, 2018), Joint Appendix
(J.A.) 353 (“Guidance”)).
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Id. at 891 (citing Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F Supp. 3d 96, 126, 146 (D.D.C. 2018)).

212

Id. at 906.

213

Id.

214

Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit on this point when citing to it later that same year.
Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020). In Diaz-Reynoso, the court took Attorney
General Sessions at his word when he declared his guidance (that generally victims of domestic and gang
violence could not establish membership in a particular social group) was not a “categorical bar,” and
emphasized that “the BIA must [still] conduct . . . ‘rigorous analysis.’” Id.
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Of course, this analysis ignores one important fact: the guidance itself merely restated the
previous, binding, Matter of A-B- rule.215 In the opinion, discussion of the guidance is closely
linked to broad discussion of Matter of A-B-, including whether either counts as “regulation,”
whether the District Court had jurisdiction to review either, and the relationship between these
and the INA’s language.216 The opinion admitted the guidance uses statutory language from the
INA to act as a “policy memorandum” that “provides guidance” to asylum officers on how to
apply the holding of Matter of A-B-.217 The government “assured” the court that “there is no
general rule,” rather “none of these groups are categorically barred.” 218 This assurance,
however, is meaningless. The case at issue, Matter of A-B-, was itself an example of Attorney
General intervention blocking such a claim and overturning what precedent had previously
allowed it.219 In other words, when the BIA strays from the Attorney General’s “guidance,” it
invites the Attorney General’s arbitrary and capricious micromanagement to align BIA decisions
with Executive Branch aims, exposing all insistence that there is no categorical bar as a lie.220
C.

BARR’S OPPORTUNITY: MATTER OF A-C-A-Ai.

BAD FACTS

On November 16, 2012, a native of El Salvador identified as A-C-A-A-, entered the U.S.
illegally near Hidalgo, Texas, and faced expedited removal proceedings in 2013.221 She claimed
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Id. at 889.
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Id. at 891–95.
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Id. at 892.
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Id. at 906 (citing Rec. 24:03–07).
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Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
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See infra Section V.

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x. 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A012.
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asylum on April 24, 2018222, arguing membership in the “particular social group” of “Salvadoran
females.”223 The IJ performed a complete analysis of this group identification analyzing whether
it was immutable, defined with particularity, and visible within Salvadoran society, and
concluded the facts met each requirement. 224 Overall, the IJ found the applicant successfully
established a claim for asylum.225 The persecution came primarily at the hands of her parents,
who for nine years beat her with various weapons, threw, punched, and kicked her while she lay
on the ground.226 They also subjected her to psychological and verbal abuse, made her work
“from the age of six,” and forbade her to attend school.227 Another source of danger came from
her “former partner,” who wounded her with bladed weapons, broke her bones, and threatened to
kill her on multiple occasions. 228 “[O]verwhelming” evidence showed the “Salvadoran
222

Id. She also sought withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (CAT). Id. CAT states that “[n]o state shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture,” and for purposes of determining such grounds “the competent authorities shall take
into account all relevant considerations including . . . a consistent pattern . . . [of] violations of human
rights.” Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 (Dec. 10, 1984). A discussion of claims under the CAT are beyond the scope of
this article (the IJ here did not reach the issue), but it is worth noting another example of the United
Nations’ treatment of asylum law focusing on the humanitarian needs of those asylees/refugees. Id.
223

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, supra note 221, at A-018 (which appends the IJ opinion on appeal in
Matter of A-C-A-A-).
224

See id. at A-019–020. For immutability, the IJ adopted the logic of the Ninth Circuit, finding
“Salvadoran females,” a group defined by its gender and nationality, “satisfies the immutability
requirement.” Id. at A-019; See also Mohammad v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005). For
particularity, the IJ said “Salvadoran females” was “limited to a discrete section of Salvadoran society—
only female citizens of El Salvador—and [was] thus distinguishable from the rest of society.” Amicus
Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x at A-019. Finally, while discussing visibility the IJ
proactively responded to the circularity rule by pointing out the overwhelming evidence showing
misogyny was “reinforced at every stage” and violence against women was “deeply entrenched in
Salvadoran society.” Id. at A-019–020. This evidence shows rather than being defined circularly, it was
clear “Salvadoran society” targeted females for victimization and persecution. Id.
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Id. at A-025.
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Id. at A-018.
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Id.
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Id. at A-023.
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government [did] not adequately protect females from gender-based violence” and what laws
addressed gender-based violence “remained poorly enforced.”229
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed, arguing the IJ on the case failed
to “establish the nexus requirement” between the applicant’s persecution and her membership in
a particular social group and challenging the IJ’s credibility findings.230 The BIA decisively
dismissed this appeal, citing the INA rule stating it reviews “law, discretion, and judgment”
issues de novo. 231 However, the BIA cannot engage in de novo review pertaining to “findings of
fact determined by the immigration judge” and reviews questions of law only for “clear error.” 232
i.

BAD LAW

Motivated by frustration with the BIA holding, Attorney General William Barr elected to
take this case under review and overturned the BIA, claiming it failed to “meaningfully
consider[] any of the elements of the respondent’s asylum claim.” 233 He specifically focuses on
the “nexus” element of the applicant’s claim, which says that an asylum applicant must show
their membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant,”234 saying that “[a] closer examination . . . in light of the record, would have raised
questions concerning” this element. 235 Therefore, he instructed the BIA to review “the
immigrations judge’s legal conclusions de novo,” and to “analyze whether the [applicant] could
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Id. at A-021.
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Id. at A-010.
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Id.
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Id. at A-010–11; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii–iii) (2007).
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 84, 84, 91 (A.G. 2020).
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8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 93.
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establish that the nexus requirement had been satisfied.”236 In explanation of de novo, he asserts
the BIA should have evaluated “specific facts and evidence” regarding whether the applicant’s
claim met this nexus requirement. 237
Furthermore, Barr misrepresents the IJ’s analysis concluding the applicant “establish[ed]
that her membership in a particular social group was at least one central reason for [her]
persecution.”238 Barr accuses the IJ of “not cit[ing] any evidence that the respondent’s parents
themselves had ever . . . express[ed] hostility to ‘Salvador females’ in general,” as opposed to
merely toward their daughter.239 Barr’s accusation is simply false; the IJ explicitly explained
“[t]he record is replete” with evidence the applicant’s parents acted violent to her “because she
was a Salvadoran female.”240 Barr focuses on the prima facie nature of statements arguing they
do not, alone, indicate broader persecution. 241 The IJ rightly points out “[i]n the context of
Salvadoran society” evidence showed the violence the applicant experienced was “the type of
gender-based violence perpetrated in El Salvador due to the widely-shared belief that women are

236

Id. at 94.

Id. at 92. Keep in mind that the BIA’s review was limited to questions of law, not fact. 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(d)(3)(i).
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Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A020 (internal quotations omitted).
238

239

Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 93.

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A021. “[H]er parents repeatedly made derogatory statements indicating that they believed they could treat
the respondent however they wished because, as a female, the respondent must obey them.” Id. Her
father told her that as his daughter, she had to do what he said. Id. Both parents explicitly forbade her
from attending school because “as a female, she should clean and take care of the house.” Id.
240
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 93–94 (arguing there is only evidence of personal animus between the
parents and their daughter that does not rise to the level of proving “a general animus against a broad
social group.”).
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inferior to men.”242 If the applicant “were not a Salvadoran female,” she would not have
suffered harm “in this manner,” and therefore, a nexus existed. 243
Attorney General Barr also disagrees with the IJ’s finding in favor of humanitarian
asylum.244 Although Barr frames his objections as against the BIA’s analysis and standard of
review, stating he does “not consider” whether the applicant warrants humanitarian asylum, it is
clear that Barr’s concern is with the conclusion.245 Barr claims the BIA “neglected to . . .
analyze whether the immigration judge’s conclusions were consistent with” BIA precedent.246
Therefore, Barr instructs the BIA to “meaningfully analyze [whether] the respondent’s alleged
past persecution [was] on account of her membership in a particular social group,” including by
reviewing the analysis of “other serious harm.” 247 Taking this holding a step further, he demands
the BIA “not affirm the immigration judge’s decision unless the Board concludes that the

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A021.
242

Id. Barr cites Matter of A-B-, which held a similar particular social group claim—one of “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”—did not meet INA requirements
because it was not “defined with particularity” nor did the group “exist independently” of the persecution.
Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 90. He criticizes the BIA for agreeing with the IJ that the “persistence of
domestic violence in El Salvador” could be probative evidence showing a nexus between that particular
social group and the persecution. Id. In 2021, Acting Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen revisited Barr’s
decision in Matter of A-B- to clarify, among other things, this nexus requirement. 28 I&N Dec. 199, 207–
212 (A.G. 2021). To show a nexus “between past or feared future persecution and one of the protected
grounds,” including particular social groups, “requires proof that the persecutor knew or believed that the
applicant had one of these protected characteristics, and that knowledge or belief motivated the
persecutors’ harmful actions against the applicant.” Id. at 207–08. The IJ’s analysis would easily stand
under this new rule, since the parents, ex-husband, and Salvadoran government all knew she was a
“Salvadoran woman,” and given the underlying misogyny, which has been discussed, this knowledge
clearly motivated the persecution. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722
(11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A-020–21.
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Id.; See Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 Fed.Appx. 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–
70311), at A-023–24.
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 95.
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respondent has met her burden and has satisfied” the required elements to prove need for
humanitarian asylum.248 This holding lays bare the fundamental role of the BIA, not to be a
body of judicial appeal, but to be a tool of executive action, because to be the former requires the
BIA to behave outside the normal bounds of a judicial body.
First, we should consider the BIA’s standard of review when it considers IJ opinions.
Chapter Eight of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the powers of the BIA, including the
scope of review.249 These regulations intend the BIA to “function as an appellate body,”
reviewing administrative decisions under the INA “in a manner that is timely, impartial, and
consistent with the [INA] and regulations,” and “not engag[ing] in de novo review of findings of
fact determined by an immigration judge.”250 Regarding those findings of fact, the BIA merely
reviews to determine whether those findings were “clearly erroneous.” 251 According to the
Supreme Court, a finding of fact is “clearly erroneous” only when, despite supporting evidence,
the reviewing body “on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed,” and has characterized this standard as “significantly
deferential.”252 When reviewing IJ decisions, the BIA may consider a factual finding “clearly
erroneous” only when they are “illogical or implausible.”253 Applying these standards, the BIA

248

Id. at 95–96.
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See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d).
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993).
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Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N at 341; See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). In
Matter of A-B-, Sessions even points out that in the context of the BIA’s scope of review, “where
credibility determinations are at issue, . . . even greater deference must be afforded to the [immigration
judge]’s factual findings.” 27 I&N at 341; Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).
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here found no clear error, saying: “While we may have reached a different result if we were the
factfinders, we discern no clear error in the immigration judge’s findings of fact supporting her
positive credibility finding.”254
Barr instructed the BIA to essentially ignore this “clearly erroneous” standard. Rather
than state reasons for having a definite or firm conviction that the IJ’s analysis was wrong, Barr
opines a “closer examination” would have “raised questions.” 255 This ignores the fact that the IJ
already performed that close examination, discussing in detail not only the facts in favor of the
applicant’s asylum claim but also the inconsistencies between the applicant’s “testimony and
documentary evidence.”256 Specifically, the IJ takes issue with the applicant’s testimony
regarding 1) the Salvadoran government’s role in permitting persecution by her husband and 2)
her own criminal history.257 To the former, the IJ points out that the applicant testified her
husband had “never been arrested in connection to his abuse,” while her credible interview
contradicted that statement. 258 To the latter, the applicant denied ever being arrested,
withholding the fact Salvadoran police briefly detained her when she scolded her niece in public

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A010 (emphasis added).
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 94.

Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Castro v. Barr, 819 F.App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 20–70311), at A014–15.
256

257

Id.
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Id.

When confronted with her [credible fear interview] testimony, [the applicant] replied that she could not
remember his arrest or perhaps she or the asylum officer were confused. The Court does not find this
explanation sufficiently persuasive because [the applicant] did not otherwise assert encountering any
communication difficulties with the asylum officer.
Id.
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and “released her later that day.”259 Reviewing these issues, the IJ said the applicant’s
“willingness to withhold information detrimental to her case” troubled her and believed that
these inconsistencies “bear directly on the heart of the respondent’s claim.”260 Nevertheless,
these inconsistencies did not make up the whole of the evidence.261 Under the totality of the
circumstances, including the conditions in El Salvador explored above, the IJ found the applicant
“marginally credible” and therefore “decline[d] to make an adverse credibility finding.” 262
The BIA here provided the IJ’s decision its warranted deference.263 Though Barr decries
the BIA for “deferring to the immigration judge’s credibility finding and concluding . . . that it
could ‘discern no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s determination,’” that was clearly the
BIA’s prerogative.264 Barr criticizes the BIA for behaving in what he considers “a conclusory
fashion,” implying it failed to apply the proper standard of review while also implicitly
demanding that the BIA substantially abandon that same standard of review. 265 Yet Barr’s
criticism of the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s analysis clearly lacks credibility when
considering the actual analysis itself. 266 Barr implores the BIA to “examine de novo whether the
facts found by the immigration judge satisfy all of the statutory elements of asylum as a matter

Id. at A-014. “On redirect, the respondent added that she did not believe she was arrested because she
was not handcuffed or detained in a cell; rather, the police required her to wait in the police station until
they released her.” Id. at A-015.
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of law.”267 These instructions contradict any reasonable interpretation of law, but it is worth
asking whether this is fairly considered a pure issue of legal interpretation. 268 Fully
understanding this issue requires departing the world of pure legal reasoning, exploring the
source of these confused decisions in the political realm, and exploring the wider implications of
the BIA’s position in our governmental structure.
V.
A.

THE SOURCE: ASYLUM LAW AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM
THE POLITICS OF WILLIAM BARR

William Barr’s views on immigration and asylum are well-documented. Barr has stated
he believes asylum applicants abuse the system. 269 He also believes asylum applicants are
“being coached as to what to say” to get asylum at all costs and that illegal immigration, in part
through this alleged abuse, has generally worsened over the last three decades, creating “unsafe
conditions for many people.”270 His ideal immigration system would allow entry for “people . . .
who are entitled to come into the [U.S.],” but “keep[s] out those that are flouting our laws.”271

267

Id. at 84 (emphasis added); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

Two decades ago, Rex D. Khan argued the “disparate treatment of victims [in asylum law]
demonstrates that refugee status is not truly based on humanitarian concerns,” and instead asylum status is
“inherently political in nature.” Rex D. Khan, Why Refugee Status Should Be Beyond Judicial Review, 35
UNIV. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 57, 57 (1999). While this statement is true, his further conclusion—that
any interference in asylum matters by the judiciary should be decried as judicial activism overstepping its
bounds into “nonjusticiable political questions”—is clearly absurd given the consequences of unfettered
Executive power in this realm. Id. at 79–81. The two decades since Khan’s article have shown the
Executive Branch, when left to its devices, can easily match, and exceed, the Judiciary in arbitrariness and
incompetence.
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United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 40 (2019) (statement of General Barr),
https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116shrg36846/CHRG-116shrg36846.pdf [hereinafter William
Barr Confirmation Hearing].
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Barr sees immigration as a way of “rationing” the wealth of the U.S. among those that would
migrate and become citizens here. 272 He analogizes asylum itself to a “back door”—a way for
migrants to “just walk[] up to the front” of a line of people—and calls it “unjust” and “unfair” to
traditional immigrants.273 This characterization of asylum as a large back door for immigration
is unfounded, as the United States accepts fewer asylees per capita than forty-nine other
nations.274
His record as a public servant also confirms that Barr’s concern with the supposed abuse
of the asylum process trumps other considerations, including the rights of asylum applicants.
William Barr has been called a “maximalist” regarding his views on executive power and
immigration policy, and has stated he seeks to be a “political subordinate” to the President and
his goals.275 Most importantly for our discussion, Barr frequently invokes his power to intervene

People would get on the airplane, they’d come to the United States, and then they’d claim asylum as soon
as the airplane touched down. . . . They’d be put out on parole pending their asylum hearing, and then
they’d disappear. Then we tried detaining them, and we ran out of space in New York. We had 40,000,
50,500 a month. It was just unbelievable, the influx coming into the United States claiming asylum. I
can’t vouch for that figure, but we just didn’t have the space to put them
Id. Barr’s predecessor Sessions expressed similar guiding views on asylum policy, stating he believed
asylees have “[p]owerful incentives . . . created for aliens to come here illegally and claim a fear of
return.” Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
Legal Training Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-officeimmigration-review-legal. In that speech, he claims, “word spread [among migrants] that by asserting
[credible] fear, they could remain in the United States one way or the other.” Id. Sessions made it clear
he believes most asylum claims are not valid, which explains much of the decision-making discussed in
this article. Id. While he claims the “percentage of asylum claims found meritorious by our
[immigration] judges has declined,” this is likely not due to the claims’ inherent merit, but the
increasingly stringent and unreasonable standards imposed. Id.
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David J. Bier, 49 Nations Accept Asylees & Refugees at Higher Rates Than America, CATO
INSTITUTE (July 20, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/49-nations-accept-asylees-refugees-higher-ratesamerica.
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John Washington, William Barr May Be Worse On Immigration Than Jeff Sessions, THE INTERCEPT
(January 15, 2019, 4:30 a.m.), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/15/william-barr-confirmation-hearings-
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in BIA cases with worrisome frequency and to controversial effect. 276 Immigration Judge J.
Tracy Hong, who retired amid “pressure to speed up cases and deport more people,” considers
the power of “certification”—allowing the Attorney General to refer BIA decisions to himself
and then overturn them—a “nuclear option.”277 It is “a way for the attorney general [sic] to
stamp his or her own views on immigration law.” 278 Some have called it “abuse,” yet it clearly
lies within the purview of the powers of the Attorney General.279
In Matter of A-C-A-A-, Barr reinforces Sessions’s earlier guidance: while courts should
still review matters on a case-by-case basis, in his opinion certain groups will never qualify.280
[I]t seems unlikely that the respondent will be able to demonstrate that she
suffered persecution based on membership in a social group as broad as all
‘Salvadoran females,’ because of the need to establish that the private violence
reflected a general animus against a broad social group rather than the personal
animus arising from the relationship between the purported persecutors and the
asylum applicant.281

immigration/. Barr believes the Attorney General serves three roles: (1) to enforce the law, (2) to be a
legal advisor to the President, and (3) to execute the policy goals of the President. William Barr
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 270.
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Kim Bellware, On Immigration, Attorney General Barr Is His Own Supreme Court. Judges and
Lawyers Say That’s a Problem, WASH. POST (March 5, 2020, 6:51 a.m.),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2020/03/05/william-barr-certification-power/.
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Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).
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Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N at 94.
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Id.; cf. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018):

Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental actors will not qualify for asylum. While I do not decide that violence inflicted by nongovernmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on
membership in a particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory
grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to address. The mere
fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or
gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish
an asylum claim.
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Here, Barr not only implies the BIA should presume private violence does not originate in
systemic violence but imposes his view of how the BIA ought to decide these cases.282 This
imposition is not unique to Barr but stems from a broader political struggle against immigration
generally.283
B.

THE BIA AS EXECUTIVE WEAPON

Any administration must overcome clear barriers to make any progress in asylum
adjudication after the Trump administration,284 yet President Biden has taken steps to do so.285
In March, 2021, Merrick Garland replaced William Barr as Attorney General.286 Early on, few
had any clear idea how he would approach immigration, let alone asylum, matters.287 Garland
does, however, share an important attribute with Barr—extreme deference to an executive branch

Of course, William Barr is not unusual in his opinions on immigration, as 75% of Republicans (Barr’s
party) believe “immigrants burden local communities,” 74% of Republicans were in favor of the
infamous “travel ban” on persons from Muslim-majority countries, and 56% of Republicans “object to
allowing immigrants brought illegally to the U.S. as children to gain legal resident status.” Engy
Abdelkader, Immigration in the Era of Trump: Jarring Social, Political, and Legal Realities, 44
HARBINGER 76, 93 (April 24, 2020). As Abdelkader says, “[x]enophobia has translated into jarring
social, political, and legal realities for immigrant populations and socially oppressed groups in ways that
overlap and intersect,” and this has extended to the asylum context. Id.
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Sarah Libowsky & Krista Oehlke, President Biden’s Immigration Executive Actions: A Recap,
(Mar. 3, 2021, 12:13 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-bidens-immigrationexecutive-actions-recap#Asylum (identifying three primary obstacles: (1) the sheer number of changes
and time it would take to reverse them; (2) the potential for mutiny and enforcement refusal by ICE and
state-level officials; and (3) the fact that “Trump’s anti-immigrant legacy has left completely gutted
systems in its wake” on which an administration will have to rely to make change).
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and orderly reception and processing” of asylees and directing it to either revoke or “promptly review”
multiple Trump immigration policies).
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with his preferred party in power.288 It is as no surprise, then, that Garland quickly elected to
review Matter of A-B-, overturning it.289 This decision followed an Executive Order from the
President instructing the Attorney General to “address the circumstances in which a person
should be considered a member of a particular social group.”290 He rightly characterizes Matter
of A-B- as setting a “strong presumption against asylum claims based on private conduct,”
discouraging case-by-case analysis.291 As he says, his predecessors “sometimes have vacated
Attorney General or Board opinions in light of pending or future rulemaking,” and he did
likewise.292 Garland declared asylum issues should be “left to the forthcoming rulemaking,”
coming from the President, “with the benefit of a full record and public comment.” 293 One
wonders whether Garland believes this fix, immediately endangered under any forthcoming
administration, is truly a fix at all. While Garland’s holding reverts to a more humane rule, it
fails to address the underlying cause of the problem: the relationship between the BIA, the
Attorney General, and the President. 294
To be clear, while it is fair to criticize Barr’s anti-asylum policies and frequent
interference with the BIA as extreme, abusive, and harmful, his actions were not unlawful. The
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Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307, 307–09 (A.G. 2021).
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Id.at 308 (internal quotations omitted).
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Id. at 309.
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Libowsky & Oehlke, supra note 284. “[I]n the absence of congressional action in the past decade, the
fates of immigrants in the United States will remain subject to the whims of the executive branch.” Id.
The authors criticize Biden’s actions as having “limited scope and effect” but commend them for being
“nuanced, thoughtful and pragmatic” with “the potential to serve as a guidepost for more sustained,
lasting reform.” Id.
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Attorney General’s powers include review of BIA decisions and setting of binding precedent.295
The Attorney General’s power over the BIA, however, goes further. Ultimately, BIA decisions
are only final unless “reviewed by the Attorney General.”296 The Attorney General appoints
attorneys to the BIA “to act as [his or her] delegates,” chooses the Chairman of the BIA, and
governs the BIA through decisions made under discretionary review.297 The relationship
between the BIA and Attorney General is more like that of “an employee and his superior” than
that of “an administrative agency and a reviewing court.” 298 Therefore, while it is important to
note Barr’s abuse, it is also important to recognize the law facilitates that abuse.299
A replacement Attorney General, therefore, solves nothing because the current
administrative framework permits these abuses by any man or woman in that role—regardless of
party or politics. Therefore, it stands to reason that a Garland-run DOJ will be just as efficient a
tool for the President as a Barr-run DOJ—the only difference being the directed policy
preferences of the President himself. 300 The Attorney General serves as a weapon for the
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Others have recognized this Attorney General power over the BIA as abusive. See generally Julie
Menke, Abuse of Power: Immigration Courts and the Attorney General’s Referral Power, 52 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 599 (2020). Its proponents argue it “allows the Attorney General to establish definitive
interpretations of immigration law and efficiently implement executive branch immigration policy,” but
whether this is a benefit depends on the merits of those interpretations and policy. Id. at 625. Menke
argues for either limiting Attorney General review to “when the BIA or the Department of Homeland
Security requests review” or restricting his or her “standard of review.” Menke supra, note 293 at 625–
27. Both would be reasonable reforms, but they still ignore the inherent opportunities for manipulation
that remain. See e.g. supra Section C(i), (ii). Broader, more systematic change is warranted.
The ACLU supported Garland’s nomination for this very reason. Cecilia Wang, Jeffery Robinson &
Louise Melling, Merrick Garland Can Transform the Department of Justice. Will He? ACLU (Feb. 19,
2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/merrick-garland-can-transform-the-department-ofjustice-will-he/. They argue Garland “will be a critical actor” in “carry[ing] out President Biden’s
promised overhaul of the U.S. immigration system.” Id. They implore him to “commit to rescinding and
replacing his predecessors’ opinions that attempted to rig the asylum rules against people fleeing
300
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Executive Branch and the President, to be wielded in whatever way desired to enact their
political will. That remains the case no matter who occupies the Attorney General’s position.
C.

CONSOLIDATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER

Despite its long history as a destination for migrants, the United States has never
recognized a constitutional right to asylum and is unlikely to ever do so. 301 Nor has the Supreme
Court ruled “on what constitutional protections” to which asylum seekers are legally entitled. 302
The Court instead held that as to migrants, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” 303 The judiciary
branch has therefore “taken a hands off approach to immigration issues.” 304
Furthermore, Congress has over the years abandoned its role as the shepherd of
immigration policy. Scholars widely accept that the Constitution, through the Naturalization and

persecution in Central America and elsewhere.” Id. Such support—while agreeable—assumes a
worrying reality that systematic change is impossible or unlikely, and that the only hope for asylum
applicants is to maintain the right people in power. Id.
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See generally Lucas Kowalczyk & Mila Versteeg, The Political Economy of the Constitutional Right
to Asylum, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1219, 1236–38 (2017) (compiling a comprehensive analysis of asylum
as a constitutional right worldwide from the perspective of national self-interest and geopolitics).
France’s Constitution Article 53–1 provides “authorities of the Republic” may “grant asylum to any
foreigner who is persecuted for his action in pursuit of freedom or who seeks the protection of France on
other grounds.” Id. at 1298. Similarly, the German Constitution provides: “Persons persecuted on
political grounds enjoy the right of asylum,” and requires a court order to suspend an applicant’s stay with
evidence their application is “obviously unfounded.” Id. at 1300–01.
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Zainab A. Cheema, A Constitutional Case for Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum Seekers:
Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 292 (2018). See also Jennifer
Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FL. L. REV. 1803, 1860–61 (2013). Koh points out that
“removability has become subject to a tug-of-war between the Judiciary and the Executive Branch,” as
well as between “the Judiciary and executive agencies.” Id. at 1860–61. Similarly, “[t]ension also exists
between Congress and the President,” as “courts have not clearly allocated power between” them in
immigration enforcement. Id. at 1862.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)) (emphasis added).
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Foreign Commerce powers, provides the textual basis for the placement of plenary authority to
regulate immigration with Congress, as part of its broad interest in national sovereignty. 305 The
Constitution provides no such textual basis for Presidential power over immigration. 306 Rather,
the Constitution meant the President's power over immigration to come only from what Congress
delegates to the Executive Branch. 307 After all, the Constitution adopts the principle of
separation of powers, and therefore “sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal
government into three defined categories” to assure “that each Branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned responsibility.” 308
Despite that underlying interest in the separation of powers, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court intends to reign in Presidential power in matters of immigration policy. The
recent decision of Trump v. Hawaii brought this controversy into stark focus. 309 There, the Court
upheld an executive order from President Donald Trump which suspended entry for foreign
nationals from certain enumerated nations for a limited time, known euphemistically as the
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John C. Eastman, The Power to Control Immigration is a Core Aspect of Sovereignty, 40 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 9, 12–13 (April 2017).
306

Porter, supra note 301 at 146–47.

Id. at 147–48. In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held unquestionably that Congress had “plenary
authority . . . over aliens,” as long as they have chosen a “constitutionally permissible means of
implementing that power.” 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also
deliberately limited the power of the Judiciary to limit the power of the Executive in immigration matters.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. at 1982.
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I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Dalen
Porter, Trump v. Hawaii: Bringing the Political Branches’ Power Back Into Equilibrium Over
Immigration, 97 DENV. L. REV. FORUM 128, 129 (Aug. 15, 2019) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at
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“travel ban.”310 The Court granted the Executive Branch deference afforded by the INA,311
which states:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the Unites States, he
may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or
impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem appropriate.312
This statute grants “deference to the President in every clause,” entrusting extreme power to the
President to decide “whether and when to suspend entry . . . and on what conditions.”313 As a
matter of “comprehensive delegation,” the Supreme Court considered this grant of power from
Congress to the President constitutional. 314
The Trump Court argued the ban did not facially discriminate against Muslims, it was not
“impossible to discern a relationship” between the travel ban and “legitimate state interests,” and
it was not “inexplicable by anything but animus.” 315 However, as pointed out in Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent, these conclusions come at the cost of “ignoring the facts, misconstruing
legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon
countless families and individuals.”316 Sotomayor explained that “[r]ather than defend the
President’s problematic statements, the Government urges this Court to set them aside and defer
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Id. at 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, dissenting). Among others, the Court ignored the President’s
stated goal of “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” Id. at
2392, 2435.
316
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to the President on issues related to immigration and national security.” 317 Accepting this
invitation, the Court allowed the President to seize executive power at the expense of the longterm possibility of immigrant rights in the name of national security. 318
VI.

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

As has been shown, the pendulum of asylum law has swung far to the side of
exclusion.319 Fueled by xenophobia and focused on executive power, recent Attorneys General
have weaponized legal formalism to define an ever-smaller category of individuals to whom they
are willing to extend asylum.320 President of the American Bar Association (ABA) Judy Perry
Martinez states the solution in the clearest terms:
We need a system of independent immigration courts that are not under the
authority of the U.S. Department of Justice—a system where judges are not
subject to arbitrary numerical quotas from the U.S. attorney general, and
procedural and substantive due process is not subject to the changing political
wings of every new administration. The ABA supports creating a system of
independent Article I immigration courts, where judges are removed from
potential political pressures.321
The recommendation to create “Article I immigration courts” refers to “[a]n independent Article
I courts system to replace all of EOIR . . . which would include both a trial level and an appellate
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Id. at 2392, 2440 (2018) (Sotomayor, dissenting). This dissent recounts bigoted statements from
President Trump, none of which need restatement, but which evince animus which the Court chose to
ignore. Id. at 2433–40 (Sotomayor, dissenting). This animus is reflected in a certain portion of the U.S.
population. See Enka, supra note 283, at 93. Justice Sotomayor goes on to argue the “travel ban”
proclamation should fail rational basis review as “divorced from any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.” Id. at 2441 (internal citations omitted).
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Judy Perry Martinez, Fighting for Due Process in Immigration Courts, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
(Apr. 28, 2020)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/immigration/fighti
ng-for-due-process-in-immigration-courts/. Martinez also identifies “meaningful access to counsel” and
“in-person interpreters” as immediately necessary due process concerns. Id.

53

level tribunal.” 322 Of the ABA’s recommended reforms, Article I courts are most likely to
succeed in subverting power in asylum cases from the Executive Branch. 323 By creating a
“wholly judicial body,” rather than a mere administrative review board like the BIA, we can
“increase public confidence in the fairness of immigration adjudication,” attract “higher caliber
judges” to the process, increase efficiency, and hold the adjudicators accountable to their
decisions and judicial ethics. 324 Most importantly, instead of being removable “at any time
without cause,” Article I judges can only be removed for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of
duty, malfeasance or disability,” allowing for neutrality.325
Such reform is sorely needed, but so is the political will. More than thirty years ago,
judicial oversight in asylum met “sustained and vocal resistance” and, as we have seen, it still
does today.326 Matter of A-C-A-A- provided Barr with an opportunity to further restrict access to
asylum as part of a broader political anti-immigration project. Barr, Sessions, and Garland are
mere political actors, and will take opportunities afforded them by our systems to pursue their
aims. Asylees, however, are not mere political pawns, but people. They are not abusers of
systems, but victims of those systems.327 Asylum should provide refuge to those facing
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Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, American Bar
Association Commission on Immigration, p. ES-9 (2010).
Id. The ABA also recommends creating a separate “executive adjudicatory agency” to “replace
EOIR,” or creating a “hybrid approach” with a trial level under the executive branch and an appellate
level under an Article I court. Id. Both reforms would be warranted but less adequate, because the
solution must permanently limit executive branch power in asylum policy-setting. Id. at ES-9–10.
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Id. at ES-69. Yet this reform would not address how “often the governmental actors who determine
removability are frontline enforcement agents” with little oversight. Lee Koh, supra note 299, at 1862.
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oppression and violence in their home nations. Manipulating legal language to make that
process harder, for self-interested reasons, is inhumane and undermines the principles of equality
and justice underlying our Constitutional government. 328
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See Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The Immigration
Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 303, 339 (2001).
[T]he ebbs and flows of immigration tides . . . will continue to buffet public sentiment and political
decision makers. The one constant, however, since the creation of our constitution, has been the
independent federal judiciary. That sentinel must continue to assure that no controversy or temporal
attitude stands taller than the great haven of the United States Constitution.
Id.
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